Aug 03, 2021
01:58 AM
- Mark as New
- Bookmark
- Subscribe
- Mute
- Subscribe to RSS Feed
- Permalink
- Report Inappropriate Content
Aug 03, 2021
01:58 AM
Hello,
I'm planing to develop an ISO26262-compliant module to achieve ASIL-B and also need cyber security.
I see from the AURIX safety manual (page 18, V1.5) that HSM is non-safety part.
I'm a bit puzzled about this. For example, CAN FD encrypted communication (AP32330). From Fig 11 we can see the bare data is sent to HSM to generate encrypted data, then it go to can module to send out.
I'm wondering if HSM has sorts of fault, generate an incorrect encrypted data. The data is loaded into CAN FD frame with CRC and sent out.Then the receiver could trust this data since the CRC in CAN FD protocol is correct. This could cause a safety goal violation.
Unlike CRC, I suppose e.g. AES in HSM will not generate redundant bits which can be used to check data integrity.
So it seems the HSM module should be safety related and need diagnostic during run time?
Could you tell me what is the mitigation?
I'm planing to develop an ISO26262-compliant module to achieve ASIL-B and also need cyber security.
I see from the AURIX safety manual (page 18, V1.5) that HSM is non-safety part.
I'm a bit puzzled about this. For example, CAN FD encrypted communication (AP32330). From Fig 11 we can see the bare data is sent to HSM to generate encrypted data, then it go to can module to send out.
I'm wondering if HSM has sorts of fault, generate an incorrect encrypted data. The data is loaded into CAN FD frame with CRC and sent out.Then the receiver could trust this data since the CRC in CAN FD protocol is correct. This could cause a safety goal violation.
Unlike CRC, I suppose e.g. AES in HSM will not generate redundant bits which can be used to check data integrity.
So it seems the HSM module should be safety related and need diagnostic during run time?
Could you tell me what is the mitigation?
2 Replies
Aug 09, 2021
10:23 AM
- Mark as New
- Bookmark
- Subscribe
- Mute
- Subscribe to RSS Feed
- Permalink
- Report Inappropriate Content
Aug 09, 2021
10:23 AM
The argument is generally that if an error were to occur in the HSM, the odds of incorrectly authenticating an incoming message are very very small. Similarly, for outgoing messages, any errors would be rejected by the (remote) receiving side.
Jan 24, 2022
06:13 PM
- Mark as New
- Bookmark
- Subscribe
- Mute
- Subscribe to RSS Feed
- Permalink
- Report Inappropriate Content
Jan 24, 2022
06:13 PM
Thanks for reply.
I think you are correct when considering authentication, e.g. by generating MAC.
But what about encryption? The oringinal data could be corrupted, if the HSM is not safety related.
This widget could not be displayed.